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Abstract 
We examined whether the effect of an extinction phase can be influenced retrospectively by 
information about the cause of the absence of the unconditioned stimulus (US) during that 
phase. Participants were subjected to a differential fear conditioning procedure, followed by 
an extinction procedure. Afterwards, half of the participants were presented with information 
about a technical failure, which explained why the US had been absent during the extinction 
phase. The other participants received information that was unrelated to the US. During a 
subsequent presentation of the target conditioned stimulus (CS), only the former  group of 
participants showed renewed anticipatory skin conductance responding and a return of US 
expectancy. The results are in accordance with a propositional account of associative learning 
and highlight the importance of retrospective reasoning as a cause of relapse after exposure 
therapy. 
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Return of fear after retrospective inferences about the absence of an unconditioned 
stimulus during extinction.  
The decrease in conditioned responding following unpaired presentations (CS only) of 
a previously reinforced stimulus (CS-US) is referred to as extinction. The fact that extinction 
has been studied extensively can be explained by its relevance to clinical practice (Hermans, 
Craske, Mineka, & Lovibond, 2006). Clinical procedures such as exposure treatment can be 
seen as analogues of extinction procedures. Therefore, broadening our understanding of 
extinction can help us to further refine exposure.  
 Several authors have focused attention on the cognitive processes that underlie 
extinction effects (e.g., Bouton, 1993, 2002; Hermans, et al., 2006; Lovibond, 2004). Most 
theories postulate the existence of associations in memory and explain extinction in terms of a 
change in the strength of the association between the CS and the US (Rescorla & Wagner, 
1972) or through the emergence of a new inhibitory association (Bouton, 1993, 2002). 
Another class of theories describes the extinction process in terms of the formation and 
evaluation of propositions (De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond, 2003; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009). According to the propositional account, the extinction procedure allows 
participants to verify that the CS is no longer followed by the US. In most cases, this 
observation will lead to the proposition that the CS is no longer a good predictor of the US 
and that future presentations of the CS will not be followed by the US. The latter proposition 
is thought to be responsible for the behavioural extinction effect. 
 Both associative and propositional models can explain that extinction effects tend to 
be context specific, in the sense that a context change after extinction readily leads to renewal. 
When the extinction trials take place in another room than that in which the original CS-US 
pairings occurred, they have little effect on the CR that the CS evokes in the original context 
(Vansteenwegen, et al., 2005).  Association formation models account for this by assuming 
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that the associations that are formed during the extinction procedure and that produce the 
extinction effect are active only in the context in which they are formed (Bouton, 1993, 2002). 
On the other hand, propositional models account for the context specificity of extinction by 
postulating that people might not use the extinction trials to infer that there has been a general 
change in the CS-US relation (Lovibond, 2004). That is, if there are reasons to believe that the 
absence of the US during the extinction phase was due to a third factor that was present only 
during the extinction trials, they might doubt the validity of a general inference, and  allocate 
the change in the CS-US relation to that third factor. A change in context might signal the 
presence of such a third factor and thus raise doubts about whether the CS-US relation will be 
different when the extinction context is removed.  
Interestingly, according to propositional models, the truth of propositions can also be 
revised retrospectively, that is, on the basis of new information that is given after the initial 
proposition has been formed. In human causal learning literature, there are myriad 
demonstrations of the effect of retrospective revaluation (Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Mitchell, 
Killedar, & Lovibond, 2005). In the context of fear conditioning, Davey’s research on US 
revaluation supports the notion  of retrospective revaluation (see  Davey, 1992; Davey, 1997, 
for overviews). Davey and colleagues demonstrated that a change in the evaluation of the US 
can lead to a substantial change in the CR evoked by the CS. Importantly, the revaluation of 
the US can occur completely independent of CS-US occurrences and can be installed through 
direct experience (White & Davey, 1989) or instructions (Davey & McKenna, 1983). These 
findings demonstrate that a retrospective change in the content of the US representation can 
affect subsequent responding to the CS. However, until now, it has not been examined 
whether retrospective inferences on the absence of the US might lead to a return of CR or US 
expectancy after extinction   
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The aim of the present study is to examine the effect of retrospective inferences on US 
absence after extinction. Similar to the work of Davey, this type of retrospective revaluation 
pertains only to the US and not to the CS. However, in contrast with Davey, the retrospective 
revaluation does not involve the content of the US (e.g., the degree to which it is aversive or 
threatening) but refers to the absence of the US during a past extinction phase. Based on the 
propositional approach, we would expect that also in this case retrospective inferences will 
lead to a change in the evaluation of the CS-US relationship. More specifically, we expect that 
an explanation for the absence of the US in a past extinction phase will reinstall US 
expectancy and conditioned responding on subsequent CS presentations. 
It is important to examine the effect of retrospective inferences on the absence of the 
US after extinction because similar processes could operate in a clinical setting. For example, 
people could infer after exposure therapy that the phobic object was not followed by an 
aversive event during the therapy (e.g., they were not bitten by the dog)  because therapy had 
taken place under specific circumstances (e.g., during summer; people might think, for 
example, that dogs are relaxed and generally non-aggressive during that time of year). 
Following the propositional account, this assumption alone could lead to return of fear when 
those specific circumstances are not longer believed to be present (e.g., it is no longer 
summer).  
Our research question is also theoretically important. Whereas propositional models 
predict that retrospective inferences can modulate extinction, it is difficult to see how such 
effects can be explained by associative models. According to these models, learning (i.e., 
changes in associative strength) can occur only if the CS is physically present (e.g., Rescorla 
& Wagner, 1972) or when the CS representation is activated by the physical presence of 
another stimulus that previously co-occurred with the CS (e.g., Dickinson & Burke, 1996). 
Hence, verbal information about a cause that never physically co-occurred with the CS or US 
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should not influence the strength of the CS-US association and should thus not influence the 
extent to which the CS evokes a CR.  
Because of practical and ethical concerns, we examined this hypothesis in a laboratory 
setting. Participants were subjected to a differential conditioning procedure, in which one of 
two cues (CS+) was paired with the US during acquisition, whereas another cue (CS-) was 
never paired with the US. The effect of conditioning was measured through indexing both 
anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs) and US expectancy for both CSs. Both 
groups also experienced an extinction phase during which both CSs were presented without 
the US. After the extinction phase, one group of participants was told that there had been a 
technical problem because of which the US had not been presented for some time, but that the 
problem had now been solved by the experimenter. This information allows participants to 
infer that the absence of the US during extinction was due to that technical failure rather than 
to a change in the relation between the CS and US. Because the technical problem had been 
solved, they should expect the US after the next presentation of the CS+ and thus show a 
conditioned response to the CS+. We refer to this group of participants as the retrospective 
inference group (RIG). 
To exclude that changes in extinction effects were due to the mere fact of giving an 
instruction after the extinction trials, another group of participants (control group; CG) was 
provided with control information that did not refer to the US. These participants were told 
that there had been a technical problem (no reference to US) which had now been solved by 
the experimenter. After the presentation of this information, both the RIG and the CG were 
presented with a CS- presentation, followed by a non-reinforced CS+ presentation (test 
phase). The fixed order served  to prevent order-effects, with the CS- eliciting a stronger 
response when preceded by an unexpectedly non-reinforced CS+ (Lovibond, 2003; as in  
Vervliet, Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, Hermans, & Eelen, 2005). 
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Based on the propositional account, we expected that the RIG, but not the CG, would 
show a return of CR and US expectancy for the CS+ in the test phase.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-eight undergraduate students (seven men) at Ghent University participated in 
this experiment in exchange for course credits or eight Euros. Mean age was 18.84 (SD = .97). 
Four participants were excluded from further data-analysis because their ratings on the trait 
version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) exceeded the sample mean by more than 2.5 SD. One 
participant was excluded because his score on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996) exceeded the sample mean by more than 2.5 SD. Allocation to the 
RIG and CG was randomised. Eighteen participants were part of the RIG group, 15 
participants were part of the CG. Mean age was similar in the RIG (M = 18.72, SD = 0.89) 
and CG (M = 18.67, SD = 0.90), t < 1. Also, there was a similar gender distribution in both 
groups (three and four men respectively in the RIG and CG groups), χ2 = 0.49, ns. BDI (RIG: 
M = 5.28, SD = 3.03; CG: M = 4.07, SD = 2.60) and STAI-T (RIG: M = 35.61, SD = 4.55; 
CG: M = 33.13, SD = 8.00) scores did not differ significantly between groups, t(31) = 1.22, ns 
(BDI) and t(31) = 1.12, ns (STAI-T).  
Material 
Experimental stimuli. All stimuli were presented centrally on a computer monitor 
with a resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. The background colour was black. Two coloured 
slides (335 x 312 bitmap files) served as conditioned stimuli. One slide was purple, the other 
one was green. One of these slides was sometimes (i.e., during acquisition) followed by the 
US (CS+) while the other one (CS-) was never followed by the US. The allocation of the 
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slides to the function of CS+ and CS- was counterbalanced. A 170 ms 95 dB(A) white noise 
served as US. The noise was presented binaurally with Philips headphones. The volume of the 
white noise was checked by technical staff before the start of the study. Using a sound level 
meter (Brüel and Kjær's Type 2250; Nærum, Denmark) the dB(A) level of the white noise 
was measured in the ear pads of the headphones.  
 US expectancy ratings. US expectancies were assessed retrospectively for the CS+ 
and the CS- separately (as in Vansteenwegen et al., 2005; Vervliet et al., 2005). Participants 
were asked to indicate the evolution of their US expectancies for the CS+ and the CS- on 
separate graphs. The X-axis of this graph represented the time course of the experiment, with 
nine separate rating moments (first and second baseline trial; beginning, middle, and ending 
of acquisition; beginning, middle, and ending of extinction; test trial). The Y-axis represented 
the strength of US expectancy on a scale ranging from 0 (I do not expect the US at all) to 10 (I 
expect very strongly that the US will be presented).  
Psychophysiology. Skin conductance responses were recorded with a Coulbourn 
Lablinc V, which was gated to a PC through a Scientific Solutions DMA card. Signals were 
digitised through customised software (Psychophysiological Recording; PSPHR). Skin 
conductance was recorded with standard Ag/AgCl electrodes (0.8 cm diameter) filled with 
KY-jelly. The electrodes were attached on the thenar and hypothenar eminences of the non-
preferred hand, which was first cleaned with tap water. The signal was measured using a 
constant voltage (0.5 V) coupler, and digitised at 10 Hz.  
The recorded data were analysed off-line with Psychophysiological Analysis (PSPHA) 
(de Clercq, Verschuere, de Vlieger, & Crombez, 2006). For each trial, SCR (in µS) was 
calculated by subtracting the mean value of a baseline period (2 s before CS onset) from the 
highest amplitude in a 1-8 s time window after CS onset (Pineles, Orr, & Orr, 2009). To 
account for individual differences in responsivity (Lykken & Venables, 1971), amplitudes 
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were range corrected using the largest measured response for that participant during the entire 
experiment (including two US trials, one at the start of the experiment and one at the end of 
the experiment). Finally, in order to normalise the data (Dawson, Schell, & Fillion, 2000), 
range corrected amplitudes were square root transformed prior to further analysis.  
Subjective ratings. US valence and US pain were assessed by visual analogue scales 
(VASs) ranging from 0 (not at all unpleasant/painful) to 10 (very unpleasant/ painful). We 
included a post-experimental check of the believability of the experiment including two  
questions. First, participants were asked to what extent they believed the instructions in 
general by indicating a number ranging from 0 to 10  (with 0: the instructions were not at all 
believable; 10: the instructions were very believable). Second, participants were asked to 
indicate which instructions, if any, they found less believable than the other instructions.  
Procedure 
Upon entrance in the experiment room, participants were asked to complete the STAI-
T and the BDI. Subsequently, the experimenter showed the participant the apparatus that was 
used to record skin conductance responses. All participants were given the following 
instructions: 
“During this experiment, your skin conductance responses will be measured. You will 
be asked to sit in a separate room that is adjacent to this room and electrodes will be 
attached to your non-dominant hand. The apparatus here will record your skin 
conductance responses and these will be visible online to the experimenter. This kind 
of measurement is very delicate. Therefore, the experimenter will repeatedly check the 
apparatus during the experiment. At these moments, a message will appear on your 
computer screen. You will be asked to pause for some moments, until the 
experimenter confirms that you can continue the experiment.” 
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These instructions allowed us to prepare participants for repeated technical check-ups 
which, in turn, increased the truth-value of the crucial information that was given at the end of 
extinction. All participants were presented with three technical check-up messages. Two 
messages were presented in the middle of the acquisition and extinction phases, respectively. 
These moments were chosen to prevent that the presentation of the messages would co-occur 
with a change in contingencies. The third message, which included the crucial experimental 
manipulation, was provided at the end of the extinction phase. 
After the initial instructions, participants were taken to the adjacent room. The 
experimenter asked the participants to clean their hands with tap water and to take place in 
front of the computer screen. Then, the experimenter attached the electrodes. Based on ethical 
considerations, participants were confronted with the US before the start of the conditioning 
task. They could resign from participation at any time without consequences. 
Before the start of the baseline phase, participants were instructed that they would be 
repeatedly presented with two coloured slides, one of which, during later stages of the 
experiment, would be paired with the white noise (US). Participants were asked to attend to 
the contingencies between the coloured slides and the noise and were informed that they 
would be asked to report US expectancies for both slides after the task.  
Baseline phase. Two CS+ and two CS- pictures were presented in semi-randomised 
order in that not more than two consecutive trials of CS+ or CS- were presented. Each trial 
started with a 3 s presentation of a fixation cross which announced the CS. The CS was 
presented for 8 s. The inter-trial interval varied between 10 s and 18 s (average of 14s).  
Acquisition phase. An instruction on the screen announced that the loud white noise 
(US) could be presented at the offset of one of the two CS pictures. Participants were asked to 
attend to the contingencies between the pictures and the noise for the rest of the experiment. 
Sixteen acquisition trials were included. Both the CS+ and the CS- were presented eight times 
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in semi-randomised order (two blocks of eight randomised trials, each consisting of four CS+ 
and four CS- trials). The CS+ was consistently followed by the US during this phase. The US 
was presented at CS offset. Apart from this, trial course was identical to baseline.  
In the middle of acquisition (after four CS+ and four CS- trials), the acquisition phase 
was shortly interrupted by a first technical check-up message on the computer screen. 
Participants were asked to pause for some moments, as the experimenter would check the 
apparatus. After half a minute approximately, the experimenter entered the room and 
informed the participant that the measurement was going well. Participants were instructed to 
continue the experiment after the experimenter had closed the door of the room.  
Extinction phase.  Participants received no extra instructions before the start of this 
phase, nor were they alerted in any sense that a new experiment phase had started. All 
participants were presented with 10 CS+ and 10 CS- trials in semi-randomised order (two 
blocks of 10 randomised trials, each consisting of five CS+ and five CS- trials). No USs were 
presented anymore. Except for the absence of the US, trial course was identical to acquisition. 
Similar to acquisition, a technical check-up message appeared on the computer screen at the 
middle of this phase (after five CS+ and five CS- trials). The interruption by the experimenter 
was identical to the interruption that had taken place during acquisition.  
At the end of extinction, a third technical check-up message was presented. In both the 
control group (CG) and the retrospective inference group (RIG), the experimenter announced 
via the intercom that there was a technical failure and participants were asked to refrain from 
continuing the experiment. After one minute approximately, the experimenter entered the 
participants’ room. Participants in the CG were told that there had been a technical 
disturbance which was now solved. Participants were asked to continue the experiment. The 
RIG was told that there had been a technical disturbance. Through this disturbance, no noise 
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had been presented for some time. However, the disturbance was now solved and the 
experiment could continue.  
If a participant asked whether it made sense to continue the experiment after a 
technical failure, the experimenter replied that this was one of the first times that the 
experiment was run. Therefore, completion of the experiment was useful to ensure that there 
were no further problems with the script or with the technical equipment and to check whether 
the data were recorded appropriately. This was relevant for one participant (in the RIG) only. 
Test phase. Participants were presented with one CS- trial, followed by one non-
reinforced CS+ trial.1 At the end of this phase, participants were asked to rate the white noise 
(US) on valence and painfulness using paper and pencil. 
US-expectancy ratings. After the conditioning task, the experimenter entered the 
participants’ room to remove the electrodes. Participants were taken to the adjacent room and 
asked to complete US expectancy ratings for the CS+ and the CS- (separately) using a graph 
with nine fixed time points (see above) (cf. Vansteenwegen, et al., 2005; Vansteenwegen, et 
al., 2006; Vervliet, et al., 2005). The experimenter explained in detail what each time point 
was referring to. With regard to the last time point, each participant was reminded specifically 
that this trial had taken place after the last technical check-up.  
 When the US expectancy ratings were completed, all participants were given a 
questionnaire to assess the extent to which they had believed (a) the instructions in general 
and; (b) the specific instruction that had been given after the extinction phase. Participants 
were told that it was important for the experimenter to know what participants had been 
thinking during the experiment, because this could have influenced their data pattern. All 
participants were debriefed at the end of the experiment.  




Not all trials were analysed. We chose to analyse only four crucial moments: the first 
baseline trial (ba1), the last acquisition trial (acq3), the last extinction trial (ext3), and the test 
trial. US expectancy ratings were subjected to a 4 (Phase: ba1, acq3, ext3, test) x 2 (CS: CS+, 
CS-) x 2 (Group: CG, RIG)  analysis of variance (ANOVA) with phase and CS as within-
subject factors and group as a between-subjects factor. This analysis resulted in significant 
main effects of phase, F(3,29) = 13.24, p < .001, partial η2 = .58, and CS, F(1,31) = 174.41, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .85, and yielded  a significant Phase x CS interaction, F(3,29) = 65.91, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .87. All foregoing effects subsumed under a significant three-way 
interaction, F(3,29) = 3.37, p = .03, partial η2 = .26. We followed up on this interaction by 
performing 2 (CS) x 2 (Group) ANOVA’s for each experiment phase. During baseline, there 
were no significant main or interaction effects concerning CS or group, F’s < 1.55. At the end 
of acquisition, US expectancies were significantly higher for the CS+ (M = 8.76, SD = 2.09) 
than for the CS- (M = 1.27, SD = 1.84), as illustrated by a main effect of CS, F(1,31) = 
265.20, p < .001, partial η2 = .90, but there were no main or interaction effects involving 
group, F’s < 1. At the end of extinction, US expectancies for the CS+ (M = 5.45, SD = 2.10) 
were still significantly higher than those for the CS- (M = 1.76, SD = 2.24), F(1, 31)= 70.87, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .70. Importantly, however, CS+/CS- differentiation was significantly 
smaller than during acquisition, F(1, 31)= 76.07, p < .001, partial η2 = .71.  Analysis of the 
extinction data did not yield significant effects involving group,  F’s < 1.  
In the test phase, the significant main effect of CS, F(1, 31) = 72.87, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .70, was qualified by a significant CS x Group interaction, F(1, 31)= 9.00, p = .005, 
partial η2 = .26. Although both groups displayed higher US expectancies for the CS+ than for 
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the CS-, discrimination was larger in the RIG (CS+: M = 7.28, SD = 3.10; CS-: M = 1.17, SD 
= 1.47), t(17)= 7.80, p<.001, d = 1.97, than in the CG (CS+: M = 4.93, SD = 2.40; CS-: M = 
2.00, SD = 2.42), t(14)= 4.32, p<.001, d = 1.12 (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. US expectancies for the CS+ and the CS- during baseline, acquisition, extinction, 
and test, represented separately for the control group (CG) and the retrospective inference 
group (RIG). 
To ensure that there was a renewal effect in the RIG but not in the CG, a between-
phase (extinction versus test) comparison was performed for the CS+ and the CS- separately 
in both groups. In the RIG, there was a significant increase in US expectancy from the last 
extinction trial to the test trial for the CS+, t(17) = 2.39, p = .03, d = 0.60. For the CS-, there 
was a marginally significant decrease, t(17) = 1.97, p = .07, d = 0.54. In the CG, US 
expectancies for both the CS+ and the CS- did not differ significantly between the last 
extinction trial and the test trial, t’s < 1. 
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Skin Conductance Responding 
 Three participants were excluded from this analysis because of zero responses on more 
than 80 % of the trials. Analyses of SCRs were performed on thirty subjects, of whom 16 
were part of the RIG and 14 were part of the CG. 
A 4 (Phase: baseline, acquisition, extinction, test) x 2 (CS: CS+, CS-) x 2 (Group: CG, 
RIG)  ANOVA on SCRs with phase and CS as within-subject factors and group as a between-
subjects factor was conducted. Because of violations of sphericity, Greenhouse-Geisser 
statistics are reported for this analysis. The main effects of phase, F(3,26) = 6.56, p = .005, 
partial η2 = .19, and CS, F(1,28) = 30.98, p < .001,  partial η2 = .53, reached significance. 
There were also significant interactions of phase and CS, F(1,28) = 7.08, p = .003, partial η2 = 
.20, and of CS and group, F(3,26) = 6.84, p = .01, partial η2 = .20. The three-way interaction 
effect almost reached significance, F(3,26) = 3.08, p = .06, partial η2 = .10. Because of the 
relevance to our strong a priori hypotheses on differences between the RIG and the CG, we 
followed up on this interaction by performing CS x Group ANOVA’s for each experiment 
phase separately. 
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Figure 2. Skin conductance responses for the CS+ and the CS- during baseline, acquisition, 
extinction, and test, represented separately for the for the control group (CG) and the 
retrospective inference group (RIG). 
 During baseline, no significant main or interaction effects were detected, F’s < 1. 
During acquisition, a significant main effect of CS, F(1,28) = 64.25, p < .001,  partial η2 = 
.70,  indicated that the CS+ elicited significantly larger SCRs (M = 0.38, SD = 0.18) than the 
CS- (M = 0.18, SD = 0.12). There were no significant effects involving group during this 
phase, F’s < 1.36. During extinction, CS+/CS- discrimination disappeared (CS+: M = 0.20, 
SD = 0.16;  CS-: M = 0.15, SD = 0.11), with the main effect of CS being no longer significant, 
F(1,28) = 2.50, ns (see Figure 2). The CS x Group ANOVA for the test phase resulted in a 
significant main effect of CS, F(1,28) = 7.43, p = .01,  partial η2 = .21, which subsumed under 
a significant interaction of CS and group, F(1,28) = 5.83, p = .02,  partial η2 = .17. As shown 
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in Figure 2, there was no CS+/CS- discrimination in the CG (CS+: M = .19, SD = .26; CS-: M 
=.17, SD = .29), t < 1, whereas the CS+ elicited larger SCRs (M = .37, SD = .32) than the CS- 
(M = .07, SD = .15) in the RIG, t(15)= 3.83, p = .002, d = 1.09.  
Between-phase (extinction versus test) comparisons confirmed that there was a 
renewal effect in the RIG, with a marginally significant increase in SCRs for the CS+,  t(15)= 
2.04, p = .06, d = 0.59, and a marginally significant decrease in SCRs for the CS-, t(15)= 
1.88, p = .08, d = 0.49 (see Figure 2). In the CG, SCRs for both the CS+ and the CS- did not 
differ significantly between extinction and test, t’s < 1 (see Figure 2).  
Subjective Ratings 
 Thirty-three participants were included in these analyses. Participants rated the US 
noise as unpleasant (M = 78.79, SD = 26.16) and moderately painful (M = 40.91, SD = 22.69). 
There were no between-group differences, t’s < 0.39.  
 Participants assessed the instructions that were given during the experiment as very 
believable (M = 8.48, SD = 1.89). These ratings did not differ between the CG and the RIG, 
t(31)= 1.37, ns. One person from the CG (6.7%) and two persons from the RIG (11.1%) 
reported that they found the final instruction (about the equipment failure during the 
extinction phase) less believable than the other instructions. There was no significant group 
difference on this outcome either, Fisher’s Exact test, p = .52.  
Discussion 
According to propositional models of associative learning (De Houwer, 2009; De 
Houwer, Beckers, & Vandorpe, 2005; Mitchell, et al., 2009), retrospective inferences that 
give rise to an alternative interpretation of the observed contingencies should lead to a change 
in conditioned responding. Within the context of extinction, a return of the CR after extinction 
is expected when people retrospectively attribute the absence of the US during extinction to a 
third factor that was present only during the extinction phase. In the current experiment, a 
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technical failure (through which no USs could be presented anymore) served as the third 
factor. Half of the participants (RIG) were informed about this third factor after extinction and 
were told that this factor had been removed. As predicted by the propositional account, these 
participants showed return of fear on a subsequent CS+ presentation. In the other participants 
(CG), who had received control information that did not refer to the US, the extinction effect 
remained.  
These effects were most pronounced on the US expectancy ratings. A clear increase in 
US expectancies could be observed from extinction to test in the RIG, but not in the CG. The 
SCRs parallel these findings, although the effects on this measure were less pronounced. In 
this context, it should be noted that the power of our study might have been limited due to the 
small sample size. Nonetheless, although some of our findings were marginally significant, 
the crucial results were accompanied by moderate to large effect sizes, thus suggesting that 
our findings are reliable.    
The present results are difficult to reconcile with an associative account of fear 
conditioning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Even if we assume that verbal information can 
lead to changes in underlying associations, it is unclear how a verbal message that mentions 
only the US would lead to changes in CS-US association on a subsequent CS presentation. 
The contextual associative account of Bouton (1993, 2002) might, however, be able to 
account for the present findings. For instance, when participants in the RIG were told that a 
technical error had interfered with the presentation of the US, they might have retrospectively 
recoded the extinction context. This would then result in an ABA situation where A refers to 
the context in which there was no technical error (as present during acquisition and test) and 
B refers to the context in which there was a technical error (as present during extinction). 
Participants in the CG did not have a reason to recode contexts. Hence, one could say that 
they were exposed to an AAA situation. Because extinction has more impact on test 
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performance when it is presented in the same context as acquisition (AAA) then when it is 
presented in a different context (ABA), conditioned responding during test would be stronger 
in the RIG than in the CG, as was observed. Although post-hoc explanations in terms of the 
mental retrospective recoding of contexts are feasible, it is important to realise that they still 
attribute an important role to propositional processes in extinction. Whereas these alternative 
explanations maintain the assumption that the knowledge about the CS-US relation is encoded 
in an associative rather than propositional manner, they do imply that propositional beliefs 
about the reasons for the absence of the US can (retrospectively) influence the encoding of the 
context. As such, even a post-hoc associative account of our results needs to acknowledge the 
impact that retrospective propositional reasoning can have on extinction.  
The results of this study indicate that retrospective inferences concerning the absence 
of the US during extinction may give rise to a return of fear. In a clinical context, this would 
imply that although cognitions can serve as an important therapeutic tool, they are also 
powerful in reinstating fear, even after therapy has ended. Therefore, clinicians should deal 
with these possible retrospective inferences to optimise treatment outcome. One possibility is 
to anticipate on retrospective inferences during therapy or to provide follow-up sessions after 
exposure treatment during which these inferences can be addressed. Of course, these clinical 
implications are very preliminary, as the present study does not provide any direct 
measurement of fear. Future research should further investigate the role of retrospective 
inferences in a clinical context.  
Several aspects of the present data need further consideration. A first point of 
discussion concerns the small extinction effects for the US expectancy ratings. One 
explanation for this might relate to the retrospective nature of US expectancy assessment. As 
pointed out by Collins and Shanks (2002), retrospective judgements are mostly based on an 
integrative strategy. As such, participants might have judged US expectancies based on an 
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integration of the knowledge they obtained during the whole experiment (Collins & Shanks, 
2002). In relation to this, it should be noted that measuring US expectancies were questioned  
after participants had gone through a subsequent phase (test phase). The information that 
participants were presented with during this phase might have caused them to update their US 
expectancy judgement for the previous phase.  
In spite of this, the extinction phase did have a substantial impact on CS+/CS- 
discrimination. Although participants still reported higher US expectancy for the CS+ than for 
the CS- at the end of extinction, this effect was considerably reduced in comparison with the 
end of acquisition. In addition, reduced extinction effects should have occurred in both groups 
and can therefore not account for the between-group differences in the test phase. 
Another aspect of the present data that warrants further discussion relates to the 
methodology of the test phase. Participants were presented with a fixed order of presentation 
(i.e., a CS- trial followed by a non-reinforced CS+ trial) to prevent enhanced responding to 
the CS- (Lovibond, 2003; such as Vervliet et al., 2005). One could interpret this as installing a 
bias towards finding a return of the CR. On the other hand, the fixed order was used in both 
the RIG and the CG and therefore cannot explain the main results of this experiment.  
Finally, at the start of the experiment, participants were given explicit instructions 
about the CS-US pairings that they would see. Although they were not told which stimuli 
would go together, we did inform them of the fact that one CS would sometimes be followed 
by a US whereas another CS would not. The reason for this was to ensure that participants 
would consider one of the CSs (CS-) as a safety signal throughout the whole experiment, in 
spite of changes in contingencies (e.g., during extinction) or in instructions. However, it 
would be useful to examine whether our results generalise to a situation in which these 
explicit instructions are not provided.  
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In summary, the present results show that extinction effects can be disrupted by 
retrospective inferences with regard to the CS-US relationship. After extinction, participants 
in the RIG showed a return of conditioned SCRs and an increase in US expectancy for the 
CS+. These findings are in accord with a propositional account of learning, which states that 
associative learning is based on the formation and evaluation of propositions (De Houwer et 
al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2009). However, the present findings can also be explained by a 
contextual associative approach (Bouton, 1993, 2002), but only on the condition that the 
possibility for propositional reasoning is allowed within this framework. Importantly, these 
results may help explaining why many patients show a return of fear after successful 
exposure. Based on this study, we would suggest that therapists pay close attention to 
inferences that patients make with regard to the absence of the US during exposure, not only 
during, but also after therapy.  
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1 The experiment also included a reinstatement trial. After the test phase, a non-paired US was 
presented. Subsequently, all participants were presented with a CS- followed by a non-
reinforced CS+ trial (fixed order). The results of the reinstatement phase did not differ from 
the results of the test phase. It is difficult to judge whether this was due to a reinstatement 
effect or to the influence of the information that was given to participants before the test 
phase. For reasons of clarity, the reinstatement phase is not discussed any further here. 
